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Class struggle and world order 
The transnationalization of production provides the material basis on which new 
transnational classes and global politics are built. Some have argued that labour’s 
weakness when faced with capital mobility is not fundamentally new, but rather just 
another shift in the locus of the “core” of the world system, to new and cheaper loca-
tions (Silver 2003). While there undoubtedly has been a shift in production locations, 
globalization changes more than just the places where things are made. Transnational 
production also changes the nature of the interstate system, altering power hierarchies 
within and between states, and providing a shifting new terrain of class conflict. Na-
tion states may not be disappearing as such, but they are becoming less insular, and 
less able to maintain the national class compromises on which capitalist hegemony in 
the advanced industrialized world was built.
To understand the capacities and limitations of the global labour movement, one 
must understand transnational class formation. Workers and capitalists everywhere are 
embedded in the world order, whether they like it or not, or indeed whether they 
know it or not. World order structures class relations, and vice-versa, so a shift from a 
world ordered around insular nationally based capitalist systems to a single integrated 
global production system and market implies a shift from national to global and trans-
national classes. Capitalist hegemony in the world order has been built on capitalist 
hegemony in individual nation states, involving the incorporation of subordinate ac-
tors into national class compromises (Cox 1987). On the global level, the working 
class is fragmented along national lines, and relies on thin and mediated transnational 
contacts; as a result of this class structure, its transnational capacities are weak. Capi-
talism has difficulty reestablishing its hegemony on a global scale because of the fun-
damentally weakened position of labour, and because of the difficulty in creating con-
texts in which working class interests can be integrated as subordinate actors in the 
new order. This analysis suggests that trade unions, to the extent they aspire to be 
actors in the new order, should actively promote the development of a global working 
class consciousness.
There is considerable debate as to whether transnational classes exist, and 
whether they are cohesive enough to merit the term “class” (Sklair 2001; Kentor/Jang 
2004; Carroll/Fennema 2002; Kentor 2005; Nollert 2005; van der Pjil 1998). This 
article does not attempt to gauge whether national classes have reached a sufficient 
level of transnational identity, institutionalization or networking to be worthy the 
“transnational class” designation, but rather sidesteps the issue by conceiving of class 
as a structural relationship to the means of production, which does not require collec-
tive identity and purpose. In other words, the term “class” as used herein refers to 
“class-in-itself” rather than “class-for-itself”. Transnational classes therefore follow 
directly from economic globalization, without any requirement that class members 
identify with each other across national boundaries.
Transnational production and class struggle 
Transnational production allows capital to exit from national class compromises, and 
play locally rooted actors such as labour unions and governments off against each 
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other. This dynamic favours coercive solutions to the labour control problem over co-
optive ones; alienation and market discipline replace legitimacy purchased with mate-
rial concessions to the working class. As Wennerlind (2001) shows, capital strategically 
adopts social and technological innovations to protect its ability to extracting surplus 
value, by constantly changing production systems, payment schemes, ownership struc-
tures and so on. Geographical strategies, such as moving investment, or dividing pro-
duction chains spatially to optimize the characteristics of workforces involved in spe-
cific production tasks, can also be regarded as components of capital’s repertoire of 
strategies protecting the extraction of surplus value.
The shifting geographic scale of capitalist production and accumulation to the 
transnational level is a part of this ongoing process of segmentation and class con-
flict. Capital protects its ability to extract surplus by creating global markets and 
transnational production networks (Gough 2004). Like the division of labour in 
factories, transnational production allows capital greater control over the production 
process, and helps to obscure the relations of production in such a way as to make it 
more difficult for workers to recover a share of the extracted surplus value. Trans-
national production relocates bits of processes once comprehensively performed 
under one roof all over the landscape, creating what one might term ‘global facto-
ries.’ Different parts of interconnected production processes locate in different ju-
risdictions, and often in different countries, complicating the construction of worker 
solidarity and the maintenance of appropriately structured trade unions. Class con-
sciousness and union organizations must be revised and renewed out of the frag-
mented relations between now dispersed groups of workers within firms and indus-
tries. The geographical division of labour is as much determined by management’s 
need to increase its control and extract surplus as is the organization of work within 
a factory on the shop floor. 
The new global and transnational organization of production is at least initially 
less amenable to worker resistance, given the national basis of organization of the 
labour movement – if nothing else because one motivating factor in capital’s restruc-
turing along transnational lines is to reduce the capacity of workers to resist. As Harry 
Cleaver observes, there is a cyclical process of capital restructuring and recomposition 
of worker class consciousness. “Whatever new ‘class composition’ is achieved only 
serves as the basis for further conflicts, because the class antagonism can only be 
managed; it cannot be done away with” (Cleaver 1992: 7). Possibly, in time, workers 
will reformulate their own strategies of resistance and recompose their organizations 
in ways more suited to the new production processes. For now, however, the global 
labour movement is on a downward slide, with working conditions, wages and labour 
rights suffering as a result. 
Capital has grappled unsuccessfully with the problem of downward spiraling la-
bour standards. Unwilling to grant power and legitimacy to unions, firms are none-
theless concerned about the threat to capitalist accumulation presented by the grow-
ing recognition that few workers have gained, or are ever likely to gain, from neo-
liberal globalization. The decline in state regulatory capacity inherent in neo-liberal 
globalization ensures that firms can no longer fall back on the justification that their 
behaviour is regulated through law or collective agreement. The failure of national 
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systems to protect labour rights, and the inability of corporate standards to become 
a legitimate and effective private sector replacement, mean that corporations have 
increasing difficulty presenting themselves as socially responsible actors in the global 
economy. Capital attempts to re-assert hegemony while modifying its private, transna-
tional, corporate-authoritarian model of governance as little as possible. In general, 
this means self-regulation within firms, or within business associations, through cor-
porate codes of conduct. These have become the basis for private corporate sub-
systems of labour rights governance within TNCs and their supply chains; the implica-
tions of this development for labour union strategies are discussed later in this article. 
State sovereignty, national systems, and the international system 
Traditional understandings of international relations assume a world order built on 
sovereign nation states – in Marxist conceptions these sustain and are sustained by the 
relations of production in their societies (Cox 1987). In principle, these states have the 
sovereign right to govern and make law within their defined territorial boundaries, and 
are theoretically free and equal in their international relations with each other. Al-
though in many ways a constraint on capital, sovereignty also serves as an anchoring 
point for the system of property rights on which capitalism is based (Palan 2003: 87). 
Although sovereignty in theory acknowledges no higher authority, states are nonethe-
less constrained in many ways: by hierarchical power relations between states, by the 
rules of global capitalism, and by various systems of international laws and norms 
which operate on all levels of government. The increasing invasiveness of these exter-
nal constraints means that sovereignty is in some respects less meaningful than before; 
states have declining autonomy to promote national level class compromises through 
concessions to the working class (Tsoukalas 1999).
Globalization in some sense is the unraveling of the tensions and contradictions 
between the logic of national sovereignty and the globalizing imperative of capital. 
This resolution creates problems of its own, and spurs political projects to solve them. 
As capital breaks free of the constraints of the nation state system, capital also creates, 
or supports the creation of, state forms needed to preserve and sustain capital accu-
mulation outside and between nation states (Yeung 1998). These state forms are based 
partly on the structures and opportunities provided by the old inter-state system, and 
partly on political struggles between new powerful actors seeking to break free of the 
nation state system (Lillie 2006). The term state forms reflects the ambiguous nature of 
these; they are not necessarily public, but may be public, private, or a combination of 
the two; their defining feature is that they replace functions formerly carried out by 
nation states. While these state forms reproduce some of the collective goods formerly 
provided by nation states, they are also insular and technocratic in nature, seeking to 
implement specific and narrow policies related to industrial regulation (Cutler et al. 
1999) and the enforcement of market discipline (Gill 2003). As a result, the basis in 
legitimacy of the new governance is brittle, as techno-authoritarian discourse reduces 
democracy and the social contract “to an increasingly unconvincing procedural legal-
ity” (Tsoukalas 1999: 73). 
The ideal-type of international system as conceived by traditional international re-
lations and comparative political science is a world of national “varieties” of capitalism 
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(Hall/Soskice 2001) represented in international politics through national govern-
ments (Richards 1999). Nation states, with their national myths, bureaucratic capaci-
ties, and sometimes democratic legitimacy, have usually had sufficient authority within 
their borders to provide stable environments for capitalist accumulation. Shop floor 
relations of production embedded in national frameworks produce the social forces 
which form each society’s “historic bloc,” defining and limiting each state’s actions 
(Cox 1987). Under the nation state system, the state serves as mediator of these do-
mestic interests onto the international stage.
Palan observes that states have never been completely insulated and parallel sys-
tems, but rather form interpenetrating regulatory networks. As Palan puts it, the “glo-
bal market does not inhabit a homogenous judicial space” but is formed from a 
“patchwork of national system of laws joined together by a set of bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements” (Palan 2003: 87). The characterization of the world as composed 
of parallel national systems has always been a simplification, though in the past a use-
ful one. As transnational connections multiply, it becomes less useful to conceive of 
national states exclusively as separate and insular systems mediating domestic interests. 
Domestic interests are capable of acting themselves in transnational political spaces. 
States remain powerful actors, but are less insular and less autonomous, as they be-
come policy implementers of the rules of global capitalism rather than policy makers 
in their own right (Tsoukalas 1999: 73).
As the state’s mediator role is progressively circumscribed, the relations between 
world order and production become increasingly direct. National “varieties of capital-
ism” produce and are reproduced by relatively insular national production relations, so 
that their loss of insularity results in increasing instability in industrial relations sub-
systems (Lillie and Greer 2006). National accommodations for reproducing public 
goods and capitalist hegemony no longer function as well, since these can now be 
overruled by interests outside the authority of the polity in question: by private actors 
(Strange 1996), or by international organizations (Waghorne 2006). The roots of this 
process of transnationalization can be traced back to contradictions embedded in the 
very inception of nation states (Palan 2003: 63-110), but only in recent decades has the 
process intensified so that the trend is now away from consolidated, insular states 
serving as the building blocks of capitalist hegemony.
Increasingly, world order is built on integrated global production systems, gov-
erned by a fragmented hodge-podge of issue based state forms, without clear mecha-
nisms for incorporating counter-hegemonic social forces. Political opportunity struc-
tures in global politics are limited and defined by the immediate needs of global capi-
tal, constraining what subordinate actors can do with them. The narrow basis of 
global regulatory authority inhibits a more substantial “global civil society” from stabi-
lizing and legitimizing global capitalism. While state power has always been contested, 
and is not necessarily disappearing as a result of global governance, it is argued here 
that state power is fragmenting, and that this creates a fundamentally different situation 
than one in which states are unified coherent entities. This reconstruction of state 
authority is not the all-encompassing sort of authority traditionally provided by states 
operating as parallel self-contained systems, but rather is specific and circumstantial, 
with the role of state power defined by interactions with private actors, and by inter-
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national agreements made in intergovernmental as well as private and quasi-public 
contexts (Lillie 2006). Authority concentrates in insular transnational systems of gov-
ernance which emphasize alienation and coercion over incorporation and consent 
(Gill 2003). Undermining the nation state system also undermines the collective goods 
and stability states provide, necessitating increased coercion to maintain the accumula-
tion process. 
Transnational class formation 
The process of transnational class formation shapes the goals and power resources of 
class actors in global governance. Production systems produce social classes, and vice-
versa, causing a circular relationship in the evolution of production systems, classes, 
and class relations (Cox 1987). The structural definition of class implicit in Cox’s 
analysis is not universally accepted. Many argue for criteria beyond the structural, 
maintaining that social class requires some element of class consciousness. Under this 
definition, classes only truly become classes once their constituent members begin to 
see themselves as part of that class (E.P. Thompson 1968, for example, elaborates this 
view). This understanding of class, however, does not give enough analytical purchase 
in understanding the relationship between economic competition and the construction 
of class consciousness and class capacities. By separating consciousness and capacities 
from the definition of class as a relation of production, it is possible to judge how 
various constructions of class consciousness produce different kinds of class capaci-
ties. Furthermore, it becomes possible to hypothesize that some constructions of 
working class consciousness, i.e. those which more closely match the real existing 
structure of the working class, will be more effective than others in supporting the 
creation of class capacities to address the problem of global competition. In the con-
text of a global and transnational working class, national constructions of working 
class consciousness may produce relatively weak transnational class capacities, while 
certain transnational constructions may produce more powerful capacities.
This analysis, therefore, follows Miliband (1989: 41-44) in asserting an “objective” 
view of class, arising from the relations of production. Capitalists are part of the capi-
talist class by virtue of their control1 of the means of production, and workers are 
working class by virtue of their being exploited by the capitalist class. Whether mem-
bers of these classes agree with this assessment is not relevant to the issue of class 
membership. Transnational classes follow from the material conditions of production 
created by economic globalization. If a worker in Europe is producing for the same 
product market as a worker in China, these two workers are in competition whether 
they know it or not. They share a similar relationship to the world economy, and to 
the capitalists controlling the means of production. The issue of whether the two 
workers are aware of the relationship, and undertake cooperative strategies is impor-
tant, but does not affect their class status.
                                                          
1  Use of the term “control” of the means of production rather than ownership is quite 
important; ownership is no longer everything, as firms tend to be controlled these days by 
people who own only a small fraction of the stock. This does not change the overall logic 
of capitalist accumulation, however. 
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The development of class consciousness, however, is the outcome of social ties 
between individuals and political construction by groups seeking to more effectively 
carry out class struggle. The construction of class capacities, defined as the ability of a 
class to advance its own interests through organization and action, is a political project 
closely connected to the construction of class consciousness, but “class capacity” 
invokes a more strategic vision. The development of class capacities is heavily influ-
enced by class structure as shaped by particularities of industrial structure and produc-
tion relations (Lembcke, 1988) but class capacities and class structure are not the same 
thing. The way in which transnational class forms between and on top of national 
classes has implications for the capacities and limitations of global class actors (e.g. 
unions, TNCs, and transnational business associations). The origin of transnational 
classes in parallel national classes, the global governance system based on relations 
between nation states, and the global organization of production and competition all 
shape and limit the development of transnational class capacities.
The transnational capitalist class 
Institutions for constructing and maintaining capitalist hegemony arise out of efforts 
by the state and capital to minimize the threat posed by class conflict to the accumula-
tion process. The technocratic and market-oriented nature of the current system of 
global governance reflects the domination of the transnational capitalist class over the 
weak and fragmented transnational working class. For capital, the construction of 
transnational class capacities is not as difficult as for labour, because transnational 
production not only creates common class interests, but also hands capital the means 
to pursue class struggle from above, by undermining nationally based trade unions, 
and facilitating “exit” from national class compromises. Transnational firms, some of 
which employ tens or hundreds of thousands of people, rival medium sized states in 
their wealth, control production and exercise power in multiple countries. These firms 
are controlled by a global business elite, with a common ideology advocating free 
market capitalism (Sklair 2001). Interlocking firm directorships (Nollert 2005) and 
cross-national ownership structures (Kentor 2005) evidence the increasingly transna-
tional character of corporate control. Transnational production networks, alliances, 
and business associations give further coherence to the common interests of other-
wise competing firms (Cutler et al. 1999).
This is not to suggest that nationality is no longer a salient factor for capital. In-
ter-firm networks continue to be more cohesive at the national level than across bor-
ders (Nollert 2005). Corporations still struggle to manage different kinds of global 
business organizations, and to overcome ethnocentricity while retaining the advan-
tages of national models (Ramsay 2000). Despite divisions based on national and local 
peculiarities, neo-liberal globalization remains a broad and encompassing project of 
the most powerful segments of the capitalist class, with national capital fractions more 
or less permanently on the defensive. Corporate executives identify themselves as 
global, and see restriction to one national setting, or one ethnocentric model of man-
agement as “old fashioned” (Sklair 2001: Cptr 3). Corporations are driven by neces-
sity, or at least by perceived necessity, to become more transnational, and to lose their 
national perspective.
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Given structurally common interests, common ideology, and degree of transna-
tional organization, it is clear that the transnational capitalist class is conscious of the 
common interests holding it together. Global politics is dominated by capital because 
the transnational capitalist class is not only structurally more powerful, but usually also 
better organized as well. The transnational capitalist class has captured the agenda of 
key global institutions, and successfully portrayed its agenda as the common agenda, 
relying on market “freedoms” and consumerism to assert Gramscian hegemony (van 
der Pjil 1998). Internal contradictions threaten to undermine this hegemony (Sklair 
2001: 255-288), creating disagreement between those capital fractions seeking to in-
corporate labour at the global level to reestablish capitalist hegemony, and those advo-
cating more effective alienation and coercion. Capital fractions more vulnerable to 
worker resistance favour incorporation in various ways, while those less vulnerable 
seek to avoid it (Lillie 2006: Cptr 5-6). Incorporation and class compromise at the 
global level is problematic, however, because, among other things, a “genuine and 
lasting set of trade-offs between competing interests” has yet to develop in global 
politics (Sinclair 1999: 161). The global working class does not have the class capaci-
ties to serve as a viable “competing interest.”
Transnational working class 
Transnational working class consciousness is much weaker than transnational capital-
ist class consciousness because working class consciousness tends to be heavily tied 
into national identity. Labour historians and sociologists have typically looked at how 
relations in workplaces and communities build ties of solidarity among workers in 
frequent contact with one another. Workers in the same workplace and same geo-
graphic space rely on one another at work, share social networks in community and 
leisure activities, and find common cultural reference points (cf. Brody 1993; Kimel-
dorf 1988; Gilbert 1992; Koo 2001). All these supports for class formation either do 
not exist or are much weaker across national boundaries. Unlike the transnational 
capitalist class, which has at least a minimal degree of cultural coherence and identity 
outside its organizations, transnational working class capacities remain essentially a 
construct of labour union activity and strategy.
The effect of mediation through union structures is that unionists come together 
in transnational contexts not as members of a coherent working class, but as represen-
tatives of parochial groups of workers who at best feel limited and abstract solidarity 
with one another. Strategically, unionists have an interest in promoting transnational 
solidarity, but often find themselves constrained by their constituents. As Sidney Tar-
row shows, this is common in transnational networking dynamics. Tarrow notes that 
while intermediaries who connect the parts of transnational movements gain influence 
over the manner in which issues and contentious repertoires are transnationalized 
(Tarrow 2005: 209), achieving consensus is also complicated by the demands of do-
mestic constituents whose views are not as heavily influenced by transnational con-
tacts (Tarrow 2005: 161-163). Although unionists involved in international work have 
some room to shape strategy to be more solidaristic and less competitive, they also 
refer constantly back to the need to preserve the jobs of their members, and to abide 
by national collective agreements and labour laws. Likely, this is merely a case of the 
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glass being half-empty rather than half-full -- trade unionists in international work, 
using their positions in the centre of inter-union networks, have power to shape the 
character of the global labour movement, but this power is usually too limited to build 
authoritative structures to control global inter-union competition (Anner et al. 2006).
A transnational working class consciousness could logically evolve out of the 
globalization process eventually. The way in which global capital undermines national 
class compromises also serves to build commonalities of interest between workers in 
different countries, and between the global North and South (O’Brien 2004), provid-
ing a structural basis for transnational class formation. Worker migration also brings 
more direct contacts between workers, and sometimes spurs contacts between unions 
as well. Lillie and Greer (2006), for example, show that construction unions in some 
cases have made cross-border ties to deal with the issues of migrant construction 
workers in the EU. However, it is also true that this effect is limited by employer 
strategies that seek to isolate migrants from their host societies in order to more effec-
tively exploit them (Lindio-McGovern 2004; Hunger 2001).
Technical advances, such as use of email and web technology, as they spread 
deeper into society, create a basis for class formation in virtual spaces. Unions have 
used the internet strategically to support campaigns and so on. The widespread 
growth of internet access goes beyond the uses unions have put it to, defying hierar-
chical strategic direction, and facilitating direct contact between workers in dispersed 
geographical locations. As Martinez Lucio and Walker (2004) point out, “there is a 
political dimension to way the internet is approached which means that it raises the 
possibility for…a broader range of activity beyond the formal remit of trade union 
hierarchy.” Mediation by technology comes with its own problems of course, such as 
uneven access, but the spread of communications technologies and the emergence of 
global communities of interest within virtual spaces make possible a degree of direct 
contact which can compensate for the lack of traditional sources of solidarity.
Richard Hyman underlines the importance of unions as “schools of class strug-
gle” in generating working class capacities (Hyman 2001). Because weak and frag-
mented class consciousness constrains union strategy and undermines union power 
resources, it is in the interest of the labour movement to encourage the growth of a 
transnational working class consciousness. To some degree the worldwide decline of 
the labour movement may be due to the inability or unwillingness of many contempo-
rary unions to play such a role. Nonetheless, the degree to which the global working 
class is fractionalized by national boundaries is changing, in part through deliberate 
top-down union strategy. The global labour movement largely consists of the parallel 
structures of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the 
Global Union Federations (GUFs). All these international union bodies are federa-
tions of national union affiliates, who fund them, govern them, and appoint their staff. 
Although Cox observed 35 years ago that transnational labour union activity was then 
the prerogative of relatively senior officials in national union organizations (Cox 
1971), over the past two decades unions have developed extensive multi-level coop-
eration, with worker representatives throughout union hierarchies drawn into transna-
tional union activities. At the start of the 21st century, the institutional structure of the 
global labour movement is becoming more substantial, with industry level GUFs more 
232 Nathan Lillie: Globalization and Class Analysis 
experienced and better resourced, and with more company level inter-union networks 
being established.
There is a definite sense of a coherent global “movement,” but also a lack of con-
sensus and coordination on specific issues. A key indicator of how successfully the 
international labour movement is coordinating its activities in a particular sector is the 
extent to which unions are able to induce employers to bargain collectively, whether 
formally or in de facto bargaining patterns, above the national level. Even where unions 
attempt transnational coordination, bargaining authority remains firmly invested in 
national or local unions, except in the unique case of the maritime shipping industry, 
described below. Unions still lack the ability to consistently produce solidaristic rather 
than competitive outcomes through transnational networking. GUFs, in general, do 
not have authority to make binding decisions, or to enforce them. Without a transna-
tional source of union authority, common positions on contentious issues like wage 
levels remain difficult to achieve and maintain. As a result, efforts have gravitated 
either toward loose agreements which are routinely ignored (as in European bargain-
ing coordination), or minimum standards built on basic labour rights (as in Global 
Framework Agreements). Except in maritime, the labour movement has focused 
mostly on building networks within transnational firms and production chains. 
The pull of firm level networks has an opportunistic logic to it, particularly in 
Europe where the supranational politics of the EU have resulted in legal backing for 
European Works Councils (EWCs). Though basically limited to Europe (although 
their influence sometimes extends outside Europe as well), these are now the most 
widespread vehicles for transnational union contacts, with about 750 of them in op-
eration in 2005.2 EWCs bring together thousands of plant level worker representatives 
from different site in TNCs on an ongoing basis. Although EWCs have been known 
on occasion to facilitate cross-national union mobilization,3 they function unevenly, 
are not necessarily union controlled, and often have difficulty bringing about common 
positions on contentious issues because of competition between production sites 
(Whittall 2005), among other problems. Global union networks, set up by GUFs, also 
exist in some TNCs, but have similar difficulties to those encountered by EWCs, 
which are exacerbated by a shortage of resources in cases where management does 
not contribute to their funding (Müller/Platzer/Rüb 2004).
GUFs, GUF affiliates and firm level networks negotiate Global Framework 
Agreements (GFAs), which are essentially corporate codes of conduct which unions 
have signed on to, in exchange for influence over their content, and participation in 
their monitoring. GFAs serve to shield TNCs from negative publicity, foster positive 
relations with unions, and in some cases provide access to “socially responsible” niche 
markets (Christopherson/Lillie 2005). With a few exceptions, GFAs have only been 
signed by European based firms, with a heavy bias toward northern Europe. Advo-
cates of GFAs assert that union involvement makes them different from normal cor-
                                                          
2  http://www.etuc.org/IMG/pdf/7c-EWCs_Coverpage-EN.pdf
3  This occurred, for example, in the transnational “euro-strike” against the closure of the 
Renault plant in Vilvoorde, Belgium in 1997 (Lillie 1999). 
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porate codes (Tørres/Gunnes 2003), although the difference may be more nuanced 
than fundamental. As Tørres and Gunnes point out, codes of conduct usually have 
weak or nonexistent labour clauses. As documents of corporate policy, they have no 
legal weight, and are enforced, or not, at the discretion of the company. GFAs provide 
for union participation in monitoring, but the response to uncovered violations is at 
the discretion of the firm. There is, however, an assumption that TNCs will attempt to 
correct problems because to fail to do so would be to lose the benefit of the agree-
ment, and invite a campaign from the union side. Regardless of their effectiveness (or 
lack thereof) in practice, the content of GFAs does not take unions beyond the low-
est-common-denominator approach to bargaining: GFAs protect basic labour rights, 
to the extent they protect anything at all.
Industry level networks might be more functional in producing effective bargain-
ing leverage, following the classic J.R. Commons (1909) approach of taking wages out 
of competition across entire product markets, although at the global level this has 
proven difficult to achieve. So far only the International Transport Workers’ Federa-
tion (ITF) has made a serious effort as part of its campaign to regulate conditions on 
Flag of Convenience (FOC) shipping. The FOC campaign institutionalizes transna-
tional cooperation through a global network of union ship inspectors in ports around 
the world. The world network bypasses national union offices and places local union-
ists into direct and regularized contact with one another, enabling the ITF to force 
employers into industry level global collective bargaining using coordinated industrial 
action. However, most union leverage derives from secondary industrial action by 
port workers, so it is possible to bargain without any need to involve the seafarers 
whose pay is being negotiated.4 Efforts to bring about transnational industry level 
bargaining coordination in other industries have so far not evidenced success in terms 
of wage outcomes, although there has been a good deal of discussion between Euro-
pean metalworking unions about setting Europe-wide bargaining frameworks.5
The shift to a global stage ensures that national union structures are unsuited to 
effectively organizing and channelling worker resistance, but the company based 
transnational networks which are most often the alternative tend to structure inter-
union contact in competitive ways. Although labour unions are increasingly pushed by 
threats of economic competition and pulled by opportunities for influence into con-
structing transnational class capacities (Anner et al. 2006), the weak relations between 
the groups they represent allow management to set them into competitive games with 
one another fairly easily (Tuckman/Whittall 2002). One common response to em-
ployer whipsawing is concession bargaining, but unions also go well beyond contract 
concessions, sometimes developing competitive political strategies as well. Ian Greer 
shows how unions engage in “political entrepreneurship”, involving actively support-
ing bids by localities to attract capital. Competition and political opportunities “push” 
and “pull” unionists into local development projects and political action to save jobs, 
and away from cooperating with workers and unions in competing locations (Greer 
                                                          
4  For an analysis of the FOC campaign, see (Koch-Baumgarten 1998, 1999 or Lillie 2004, 
2005, 2006). 
5  For more details, see the work of Thorsten Schulten (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2002, 2003). 
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2005). In this way, unions become instruments of global capitalist competition, and 
the marketization of local politics. Active engagement in “political entrepreneur-
ship” (to borrow Greer’s term) deepens the acceptance of neo-liberal competitive 
ideology within the labour movement, undermining its credibility as a “school of 
class struggle.”  
The structure of the transnational working class, enforced on the labour move-
ment by its origins in the nation-state system and the transnational capitalist class’ 
divide-and-conquer strategy, pushes unions down competitive paths in the context of 
a globalizing economy, limiting the development of transnational working class ca-
pacities. As a result of labour’s weakness, global governance is being constructed 
largely as a market based capitalist project. More substantive and “democratic” gov-
ernance capable of legitimating capitalist hegemony will have to await the develop-
ment of stronger working class capacities.
Democracy, labour and global governance 
With the breakup of national class compromises, workers can no longer hope that 
their interests will be represented in national liberal democratic contexts. The con-
straints of the global marketplace and demands of global capital put the true nexus of 
power outside and above the nation state, and there are no democratic institutions for 
influencing it. Nor are global democratic forms likely to be constructed unless strong 
counter-hegemonic social forces appear in global arenas. Global governance as an 
effort to re-establish capitalist hegemony in a global neo-liberal environment (Brand 
2005) is not likely to succeed without some way to incorporate the working class into 
a global “historic bloc.” Historically, organized labour served as a force for building 
and maintaining democratic institutions in advanced capitalist countries (Crouch 
1993). Class compromises and the legitimacy of national capitalist rule grew out of 
class conflict driven by the development of national labour movements, rather than 
the technocratic design of intellectuals or visions of capitalist reformers. Labour could 
play a similar role in global politics, if more effective class capacities can be con-
structed out of the fragmented structure of the transnational working class. Under the 
current structure, however, global governance is developing as technocratic market 
regulation rather than into a polity based on ideas of citizenship and justice.
Regardless of whether the forms are democratic or not, global governance is be-
ing constructed by a transnational capitalist class in need of governance institutions 
(Gill 2003). Global politics is not being built on anyone’s assessment of what would 
be a nice global political system to have. Rather, the transnational capitalist class is 
constructing a system to solidify its control, based on the resources available right 
now. There is no particular reason to believe that these will take on democratic forms; 
rather governance follows the functional need to resolve imminent problems and 
conflicts. Thus, global governance arises out of the collective action dilemmas of 
transnational capitalism, global class conflict, and the existing structure of the global 
inter-state system (Lillie 2006), rather than out of reasoned debate, democratic theory, 
or the incorporation of subordinate groups into an historic bloc. Without strong 
counter-hegemonic social forces threatening to disrupt the process of capital accumu-
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lation, global governance will continue to favour technocratic, market-based, insular, 
and fragmented state forms.
The lack of a viable interlocutor for capital at the global level is thus a serious 
problem for the re-establishment of capitalist hegemony, because hegemony, in the 
Gramscian conception requires that the dominant class be able to deploy carrots as 
well as sticks, mixing ideological co-optation with real concessions, which, though 
substantial, can never touch at the core of capitalist control of the political economy 
(Gramsci 1971: 161). Global capitalism has built its legitimacy on the promise of con-
sumerism (van der Pjil 1998; Sklair 2001), but this is a thin reed, and in any case 
probably unsustainable as intensified exploitation reduces worker purchasing power. 
The transnational capitalist class does not have the capacity to limit itself – this re-
quires an independent political force. While there are a great many movements out on 
the global stage now, only the global labour movement has enough long term cohe-
siveness provided by consistent structural opposition to the interests of the capitalist 
class (Miliband 1989). Global capitalist hegemony, ironically, may depend on the 
growth of a global labour movement capable of forging a transnational working class 
out of many national working classes, and using the power thus gained to force real 
material concessions and institutionalized power from capital. 
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